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TORTS-AUTOMOBILES-HOST-GUEST

STATUTE-NONDRIVING

OWN-

ERS DENIED THE PROTECTION OF THE HOST-GUEST STATUTE-Hansel V.

Ford Motor Co., 3 Wn. App. 151, 473 P.2d 219 (1970).
As defendant Moss's daughter was driving downhill in an automobile owned by Moss for use in the family's construction business, the
brakes failed suddenly and the car ran into a telephone pole. Plaintiffs, riding as guests of the daughter, sustained severe injuries. The
resulting suit was brought against Ford Motor Company (the manufacturer of the automobile), Moss's mechanic (who had relined the
brakes several weeks prior to the accident), and Moss. Moss denied
negligence and asserted the Washington Guest Statute1 as a further
bar to liability. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case the defendants
moved for dismissal on the grounds that plaintiffs' evidence failed to
make out a prima facie case. The trial court granted the motion as to
each defendant except Ford, 2 but subsequently held the dismissal erroneous and entered an order granting a new trial. On appeal, Moss
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and again asserted the
host-guest statute as a defense. Affirming, the Washington Court of
Appeals held: the host-guest statute does not bar recovery against a
nondriving owner for injuries received by passengers while riding as
guests of the owner's minor child. Hansel v. Ford Motor Co., 3 Wn.
App. 151, 473 P.2d 219 (1970).
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Hansel is the product of
two competing considerations: applicable Washington law, on one
hand, and the public policies affected by guest statutes in contemporary society, on the other. It is the thesis of this note that by failing to
distinguish between these separate questions the court has invaded the

I. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080 (1961) provides as follows:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as an invited
guest or licensee, without payment for Such transportation, shall have a cause of

action for damages against such owner or operator for injuries. death or loss, in
case of accident, unless the accident was intentional on the part of the owner or
operator, or the result ofsaid owner's or operator's gross negligence or intoxication.
and unless the proof of the cause of action is corroborated by competent evidence
or testimony independent of. or in addition to. the testimony of the parties to the

action: Provided, That this section shall not relieve any owner or operator of a
motor vehicle from liability while it is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser.

2. The claim against I-ord was based upon negligence and breach of %%arranty A
jury verdict was eventually returned in favor of -ord but was not at issue in this appeal.
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legislative province and introduced undue confusion into Washington
law.
THE HOST-GUEST ACT IN WASHINGTON

I.

Prior to the enactment of the Washington Guest Statute in 19333
the Washington Supreme Court had required that gross negligence by
the host be shown before the guest could recover. 4 The 1933 Act
barred recovery by an injured guest in all cases other than those in
which the guest was intentionally injured by the host, thereby placing
a more complete limitation on liability. 5 The statute was amended in
19576 also to allow a guest to recover when the injuries resulted from
'7
the "owner's or operator's gross negligence or intoxication."
In the many host-guest cases reaching the Washington Supreme
Court the defendant has generally been the driver. The statute clearly
applies to the operator of the vehicle, against whom recovery depends
upon a determination of whether the injured plaintiff was an invited
guest or licensee who did not pay for the transportation and whether
the driver's conduct fell within the statutory exceptions: intentional
accident, gross negligence or intoxication. It is clear that the plaintiffs
in Hansel were invited, that they had not paid for the transportation,
and that the driver was neither grossly negligent nor intoxicated.
Thus, the court faced a quite different issue: 8

3.
4.

Ch. 18, 11933] Wash. Sess. Laws 145.
Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926). This requirement has "its genesis

in the law of bailments where it is the rule that a gratuitous bailee is without liability
unless grossly negligent." Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322, 324, 407 P.2d 798, 800 (1965).
See 41 WAsH. L. REv. 591 (1966).

5. It is clear that the passage of the Washington Guest Statute, as well as similar
statutes in other states, was the result "of persistent and effective lobbying on the part of
liability insurance companies." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 190-91 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Ch. 132, [1957] Wash. Sess. Laws 484.

7. A possible fourth basis, in addition to intentional injury, gross negligence and
intoxication, for a cause of action under the statute was recently added by the Washington Supreme Court-wanton misconduct. Sorenson v. McDonald, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d
93, 470 P.2d 206 (1970).
Prior to the Sorenson decision the court had decided that wanton misconduct could

not be a basis for recovery. Osborn v. Chapman, 62 Wn.2d 495, 384 P.2d 117 (1963).
The Sorenson court said that wanton misconduct lay somewhere between gross neglig-

ence and intentional tort, and held that since both gross negligence and intentional tort
would suffice to remove the statutory bar, then so must wanton misconduct.
8.

!Iansel', 3 Wn. App. at 154, 473 P.2d at 221.
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IW] hether or not the nondriving owner of an automobile may interpose the host-guest statute as a bar to liability when he is sought to be
held liable for the negligent tort of his nondriving agent.
The Hansel court viewed the problem as one of statutory construction. Declaring the operative verb in the host-guest statute to be "transport," and relying on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of that
word,9 the court held that the statute only applies to owners or opera-

tors who "carry or convey." A nondriving owner, the court reasoned,
does not "carry or convey" and therefore does not "transport" within
the meaning of the statute. In attributing such importance to the word
"transport," the court stated that its construction was supported by the

statutory exceptions 10 and by the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Upchurch v. Hubbard."
Although a plain reading of the statutory language might furnish

some support for the court's interpretation, the title of the 1933 Act
engenders some doubt as to the legislature's purpose: "An act re-

leasing owners of motor vehicles from responsibility for injuries to
passengers therein." 12 It would appear from its title that the statute

was designed to protect all owners, whether they were "transporting"
or not. When the statute was amended in 1957, however, the title was

9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1670 (4th ed. 1951).
10. Recovery is permitted under the statute if the "accident" is intentional or is the
result of gross negligence or intoxication. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080 (1961). Since
the court thought that these exceptions could not logically apply to a nondriving owner.
it concluded that the statute itself could not be so applied:
The owner or operator is excepted from the statutory immunity when he causes
an accident intentionally or when it is the result of his gross negligence or intoxication. We fail to see how a nondriving owner of an automobile can intentionally
cause an accident. Nor would the owner's gross negligence or intoxication at home
or elsewhere bring him within the immunity. The statute is clearly concerned with
the driver of a motor vehicle, whether he be the owner or just an operator.
Hln.sei, 3 Wn. App. at 155-56, 473 P.2d at 222 (footnote acknowledging that an "intentional accident" is a contradiction in terms omitted). Assuming that the nondriving
owner does not entertain a criminal intent, the court is probably correct that he could
not personally cause the statutory exceptions to come into play. But to require that each
statutory clause apply to each person governed by the statute may be just the sort of distortion of legislative intent which the court in Hansel was ostensibly seeking to avoid.
1I.
29 Wn.2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947). The relevance of Upchturch to the principal
case is questionable, however, due to its different factual setting. The owner of the vehicle in that case was not involved in the suit. Liability rested upon whether the
host-guest act was applicable where the transportation was unlawful. The court held that
it was not.
12. Ch. 18. 119331 Wash. Sess. Laws 145 (emphasis added).
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deleted.' 3 But if the general policy behind guest statutes is to be accomplished it seems that the deletion is of little consequence. That
14
policy is

[T]o rid courts of litigation arising out of automobile accidents in
which close relatives and associates sue others and engage in what is in
reality a collusive suit for the ultimate spoliation of an insurance company.
Since the owner is the one most likely to be insured,' 5 he must be afforded the protection of the statute; collusion between a non-driving
owner and a guest is just as possible, and just as undesireable, as collusion between a driving owner and his guest.' 6 Yet perhaps the most
persuasive evidence that the legislature intended no distinction between a driving and anon-driving owner is simply that otherwise there
is no need for the word "owner" in the statute - "operator" would
17
suffice.
Unable to convince the court that the legislature had intended the
host-guest act to apply to non-driving owners, the defendants next
urged the court to follow the negligent entrustment cases in other jurisdictions. As an example of the majority rule' 8 defendants cited

13.

See Ch. 132, [1957] Wash. Sess. Laws 484. See also text accompanying note 6,

supra.

14. Walker v. Adamson, 17 Cal. App. 428, 431, 62 P.2d 199, 201 (1936). Accord,
Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wn.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943). Other reasons for guest statutes
have been suggested, however, including "fairness:"
[T] he guest is an ingrate if, willing to accept the accommodation of the ride, he
is unwilling to take his chances with his host....
Comment, The Washington Automobile Guest Statute, 12 WASH. L. REV. 138 (1937).
See also Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S.CAL. L. REV. 884, 885

(1968).
15. This is especially true given the state financial responsibility laws which generally require insurance as proof of such responsibility. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE §
16450 et seq. (West 1960).
16. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 323, 327 (1963).
17. The question confronting the court in the principal case was one of first impression in Washington. But, beginning with Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615
(1936). the Washington Supreme Court has consistently referred to owners and operators in discussing the guest statute. In that case the court observed:
When the legislature enacted the 1933 statute, it did so with full knowledge of the
gross negligence rule and its effect. Obviously, the legislature concluded to limit
still further the liability of owners and operators of motor vehicles to invited guests.
Id. at 150, 53 P.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
18. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 323 (1963).
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Forgus v. Hodnet, t 9 where the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
the Texas Guest Statute (phrased similar to Washington's) could be
interposed by a defendant nondriving owner as a bar to his liability in
a suit brought by the parent of a child injured while riding as a guest
of defendant's son. The Hansel court questioned the applicability of
the negligent entrustment cases, however. If those cases were relevant
to the principal case at all, the court was "persuaded by the rationale
advanced by the courts of Alabama and California; 2 0 that is, that the

host-guest statute does not protect a nondriving owner who entrusts
his car to another.
It would seem that the court's doubt as to the relevance of the entrustment cases was well-founded. Negligence in entrustment is simply
one theory by which a parent is held liable for the automotive accident of his child. 2 1 It was a question of fact which had not yet been
decided by the trial court. The issue on appeal in Hansel was not a

factual one but a legal one: was the guest statute available as a defense
(should negligent entrustment or agency ultimately be proved) to a
nondriving owner whose negligence has not been fully litigated? By
rejecting the Texas rule and following that of Alabama and California, the Court of Appeals was simply reiterating its holding-that

nondriving owners cannot assert the guest act as a defense. Nevertheless, the court should have clarified the relationship of entrustment to
the case at hand.

19. 401 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), application for writ of error denied 405
S.W.2d 337 (1966). See Brief for Appellant at 10. Hansel v. I-ord Motor Co.. 3 Wn.
App. 151.473 P.2d219(1970).
20. i-ansel, 3 Wn. App. at 156, 473 P.2d at 227. The cases relied on are Penton v.
Favors, 262 Ala. 262, 78 So. 2d 278 (1955), and Nault v. Smith. 194 Cal. App. 2d 257,
14 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961 ). It is interesting to note that the guest statutes of California and
Alabama do not contain language which would allow the establishment of a "transportation" requirement. CAL. VEICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960); ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95
(1958). Such a requirement makes it much easier to deny statutory immunity in negligent intrustment cases. On negligent entrustment. see generally Perdue, Negligent Entrustment ofAuftomobiles, 6 HOUSTON L. REV. 129 (1968); 20 Sw. L.J. 202 (1966).
21.
See, e.g.. Warren v. Norguard. 103 Wash. 284, 286-87. 174 P. 7. 8 (1918).
Therein it was stated:
A parent is not liable for the torts of his child, even when driving an automobile
belonging to the parent, solely on the ground of relationship, but liability, if any
exists, must rest in the relation of agency or service.
Accord, Buss v. Wachsmith, 190 Wash. 673. 70 P.2d 417 (1937); Coffman v. McFadden.
68 Wn.2d 954, 958, 416 P.2d 99. 101 (1966). See generally 16 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
394 (1941); 36 WASH. L REv. 327, 329 (1961). But cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.190

(1967). This statute makes the parents liable in an amount of up to S1000 for the wilful
or malicious destruction of property by their minor child if living with them.
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The Hansel court's disposition of the question of legislative intent
was questionable, and its handling of the entrustment issue was incomplete. But beyond these aifficulties lies a fundamental gap in its
reasoning. The court stated that it found the argument in favor of
immunity for an owner "persuasive as it applies to a person trans2 2 Yet the court
ported by either the owner or his servant or agent."1
apparently overlooked a principle of agency established long ago by
the Washington Supreme Court - the "family car doctrine. ' 23 Under
24
that doctrine:
[An owner] who furnishes an automobile for the customary conveyance of the members of his family, makes their conveyance by that
vehicle his affair, that is, his business, and any one driving the vehicle
for that purpose with his consent, express or implied, whether a
member of his family or another, is his agent.
25
Since the doctrine is simply an application of the rules of agency,
the court in Hansel, by its own reasoning, should have assessed the
impact of the doctrine on the principal case.2 6 If its requirements were
satisfied, the family car doctrine would have made defendant's
daughter his agent; in legal effect, it would have been as if Moss himself had been driving. Then, any negligence of Moss's mechanic (who
was also his agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior) would

22. Hansel, 3 Wn. App. at 155, 473 P.2d at 222.
23. See Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 P. 1020 (1913).
24. Id. at 493, 133 P. at 1023.
25. See note 21, supra.
26. The possibility of applying the "family car doctrine" in this manner was not presented to the court. See Brief for Appellant, Hansel v. Ford Motor Co., 3 Wn. App. 15 1,
473 P.2d 219 (1970). The problem of an appellate court's failure to consider an established line of authority is not new in Washington. See, e.g., 41 WASH. L. REV. 585, 590
(1966):
This raises a question of the proper role of the judiciary: should the court sit solely
as an arbitrator in an adversary proceeding, or should the court conduct an independent investigation into the state of the law? Certainly, the parties are in no position to complain if the court does no more than read what is cited in the briefs. Society, however, demands more. In a system which places considerable importance
on stare decisis, the preferable procedure is for the adversary arguments to serve as
an introduction and outline for the court's research. The court should not be limited to the information presented in the appellate briefs, lest the law be needlessly
confused and unpredictable.
If the court was attempting an attack on the "family car doctrine" the opinion discloses neither a hint of such a purpose nor the reasons for such an attack. For a criticism
of unreasoned opinions see Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S.
CAL. L. Rev. 884, 886 (1968). See also, K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960).
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be attributed to Moss while in his fictional legal capacity as driver of
the vehicle. Unless such attributed negligence was gross negligence,
therefore, the guest statute would insulate Moss from liability.
The requirements of the family car doctrine were clearly set out in
27
Coffman v. McFadden:
In order to fasten liability upon the parents for the negligence of the
child, under the family car doctrine, the plaintiff must show that the
parents owned, provided or maintained the automobile in question,
and that it was for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the
family.
The first of these two requirements clearly was met in Hansel, for defendant parent owned the car. But the second requirement is somewhat more doubtful since the car was purchased by Moss for use in
his business. However, the vehicle had been devoted to general family
use during the year prior to the accident. 28 Thus it would appear that
29
the second requirement was also met.

Under applicable Washington law, therefore, Moss's daughter became his agent and the guest statute should have been available to
Moss as a defense. Ironically, however, this result would be contrary
to the rationale of the doctrine upon which the agency relationship
should have been based. The family car doctrine is a judicial creation

27. 68 Wn.2d 954, 958, 416 P.2d 99, 101-02 (1966). It should be observed that there
is no requirement that the use of the vehicle have been for the general benefit of the
family rather than for the personal benefit of the driver. This requirement is imposed in
some jurisdictions. See 49 Ky. L.J. 578 (1961).
28. Brief for Appellants at 4, Hansel v. Ford Motor Co.. 3 Wn. App. 151, 273 P.2d
219 (1970). In Dillon v. Burnett, 197 Wash. 371,375, 85 P.2d 656, 658 (1938). the court
observed:
IT] he mere fact that a car is purchased and used for business purposes does not
prevent its coming within the "family car" doctrine, where it is also used for family
pleasure.
The Dillon court quoted from X. HUDD), Au-roxIOILE LAW § 125 (9th ed. 1932).
See Hart v. Logan, 173 Wash. 598, 605, 24 P.2d 99, 102 (1933).
29. An argument that defendant Moss's daughter was not a member of the "family"
seems absurd. But there is dicta in at least one Washington case suggesting that the
driver must be a member of the collective body of persons living in the owner's household. Hart v. Hogan. 173 Wash. 598. 605. 24 P.2d 99, 102 (1933). See Plash v. Fass.
144 NMnn. 44, 174 N.W. 438(1919).
The definition of "family" seemingly adopted by the Washington Supreme Court is
extremely broad, however. It includes anyone driving the family car with the owner's
consent for a family purpose. Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 P. 1020 (1913):
Allison v. Bartelt, 121 Wash. 418, 209 P. 863 (1922). It is assumed that defendant
Moss's daughter in Hansel was living in his household, although the opportunity for argument with respect to this possible requirement remains.
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- a legal fiction established to meet the problem of plaintiffs injured
by judgment-proof children whose parents had allowed them to use
the family car. 30 Because the torts of a child were not attributable to
his parents merely because of the family relationship 31 some other
basis to allow recovery against those financially able to satisfy a tort
judgment was necessary. The family car doctrine was created to inculpate the one who supplied the car for a family purpose. But to apply
the doctrine in Hansel would exculpate the owner by permitting him
to set up the guest act as a defense. Thus, the policy supporting the
doctrine would be frustrated by its application in the principal case.
The Court of Appeals clearly wanted to reach the result it did in
Hansel, regardless of the legal confusion generated. Its decision is an
accurate reflection of current judicial attitudes toward guest statutes.
II.

GUEST STATUTES TODAY

While the Hansel court's reasoning in strictly construing the transportation requirement is at least questionable, it is hardly surprising
that a modern court would restrict the application of a guest act. It
has often been held in Washington that "[t] he host-guest statute is in
derogation of the common law and, therefore, must be strictly con32
strued."
33
Twenty-six states other than Washington have guest statutes.

30. See 16 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 394 (1941).
31. See note 2 1, supra.
32. Miller v. Treat, 57 Wn.2d 524, 531, 358 P.2d 143, 147 (1960).
33. Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1958); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-913,
914, 915 (1947); California, CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West (1960); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1953);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1968); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1401, 1402
(1965); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1, § 9-201 (1967); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. §
47-1021 (1965); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (1966); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
8-122b (1964); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1968); Montana, MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 32-1113 (1961); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1968); Nevada.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.180 (1968); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-1 (1953);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-02, 03 (1960);'Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
4515.02 (Page 1965); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.115 (1969); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962); South Dakota, S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967);
Texas, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (1948); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1

(1970); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (1967); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §
8-646.1 (1950); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (1957).

The statutes are accumulated and compared, with respect to the criteria for recovery,
in Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S.CAL. L. REV. 884, 899-901
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Thirteen of these 34 resemble Washington's in that they preclude recovery by passengers "transported by" the owner, operator, or, in one
35
case, persons responsible for the operation of the vehicle.
However, apparently no court in these thirteen jurisdictions has
precluded a non-driving owner from asserting the host-guest act, as
did the Court of Appeals in Hansel.36 Yet the courts in many states

with guest statutes have gone to great lengths in statutory interpretation to reduce their application. For example, the California Supreme
Court limited the application of that state's guest act to accidents occuring on the public highways.3 7 In addition, many courts have ex-

(1968). A more complete comparison appears in Automobile Insurance Committee,
1960 Report - Automobile Guest Lwws Today, 27 INS. COUNSEl J. 223 (1960).
34. The thirteen states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas. Michigan. New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming. Arkansas has two guest statutes. One precludes recovery by a "person transported
as U gue. ...- ARK. SIAT. ANN. § 75-913 (1947) (emphasis added). The other precludes
recovery by a "person transported or proposed to be transported by the owner or operator...- and is similar to Washington's. ARK. SI Ai. A\ . § 75-915 (1947) (emphasis
added).
The statutes do vary as to the criteria for recovery. For example, Delaware allows the
guest to recover if the "accident was intentional on the part of ... [the] owner or
operator, or was caused by his wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of others." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1953). Michigan allows recovery if the accident was "caused
by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator."
MicI. S1 At. ANN. § 9.2101 (1968). Florida provides a third example, allowing recovery
only if the injury "resulted from the gross and wanton negligence of the operator....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1968). See also note 33. supra.
35.

Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-915 (1947).

36. The courts of several states with guest statutes similar to Washington's have afforded the owner of the family car the protection of the guest statute. See, e.g., Graham
v. Shilling. 133 Colo. 5,291 P.2d 396 (1955): McAllister v. Calhoun, 212 Ark. 17, 205
S.W.2d 40 (1947): Lewis v. Knott, 75 N.M. 422, 405 P.2d 662 (1965) (dictum): Snyder
v. Jones, 392 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). The factual situation in Snyder was
remarkably similar to that in Hansel. In Snyder the owner's daughter was driving the
vehicle when an accident occurred due to defective brakes. What is surprising about this
case is that the owner knew of the defect (unlike Hansel) but was still protected. The
court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to show gross negligence of the part of the
owner. The problem of concern here should be distinguished from cases invoking statutes which provide that an automobile owner is negligent, as a matter of law, when his
child causes automobile accidents if the child is not of driving age. See, e.g.. In re
Bisone, 171 Kan. 631. 237 1P.2d 404 (1951).
37. O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994. 429 P.2d 160. 59 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967).
noted int5 SAN D1L(,0 I.. REV. 246 (1968). The California Guest Statute provides in
part: -no person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway" shall
recover anything from the driver. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960).

The court in O'Donnell reasoned that "highway" in the statute means public roadway
because it is so defined in the Vehicle Code. One author has noted that when the guest
statute was incorporated into the Code, "public," which had preceded "highway." was
deleted, thus it is possible that the legislature intended a broader application than the
O'Donnell court used. Comment, Juidicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S.CAL. L.
REV. 884 (1968). Some interesting possible consequences of the O'Donnell decision are
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pressed extreme dissatisfaction with their state's guest statute. :38
Nor has the guest statute escaped the criticism of legal scholars.
39
Attacks have been made on the constitutionality of the statute, its
effect on justice, 40 and the policy reasons advanced to support it.41
With respect to the "fairness doctrine," under which there is no liability because the guest is viewed as an ingrate if he accepts a ride and
is unwilling to take his chances with his host, the general feeling

among contemporary scholars is that circumstances have changed so
greatly since the adoption of the guest statutes that the doctrine is no
longer appropriate. 42 Commentators suggest that the guest statute fails

suggested in Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases - Lots of Them (The California
Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LascherJ. An illustration used in Lascher is that of a husband and wife driving to the post office to mail
a birthday card. Id. at 14. If the husband negligently operates the car in the driveway,
causing injury to his wife, the guest statute will not apply and she can recover even if his
conduct only amounts to simple negligence. However, if the accident were to occur
shortly thereafter on a public street. the guest statute would apply and the wife could
only recover if her husband was intoxicated or his action amounted to wilful miscon-

duct.
38. The Michigan Supreme Court has expressed particular frustration with the guest
statute:
Rightly or wrongly, our law has prided itself that those who put their faith in another shall not suffer uncompensated harm through that other's falsity or lack of
care.
Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1959). See also Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes,41 S. CAL. L. REV. 884, 896-98 (1968).
39. The constitutionality of guest statutes under both the federal and state constitutions has frequently been considered. See, e.g., Lascher, supra note 37. An attack on the
guest statute based on the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment was rejected
in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). Professor Lascher argues that the guest statutes
fail the test of reason and rationality required by the 14th amendment. Lascher, supra
note 37, at 9-15.
40. See, e.g., Comment, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV.
321 (1966). Most frequently noted is the unjust distinction between the pedestrian and
the passenger.
41. Dean Prosser has stated that:
The typical guest act case is that of the driver who offers his friend a lift to the office
or invites him out to dinner, negligently drives him into a collision, and fractures
his skull - after which the driver and his insurance company take refuge in the
statute, step out of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. If this is
good social policy, it at least appears under a novel front.
W. PROSSER, LAW oFTORTS § 34, at 191 (3d ed. 1964) (footnote omitted).
42. At the time of the adoption of most guest statutes in the 1920's and 1930's, the
automobile was not a necessity. It may have been true then that the guest was getting
"something for nothing." See Gibson, Let's Abolish Guest Passenger Legislation, 35
MANITOBA B. NEvs 274 (1965). Today, however, providing or accepting rides is routine. Reciprocity means that the guest is not really getting a free ride. Id. at 275.
The fairness doctrine has been criticized for not accomplishing fairness to the driver
at all. Since most states require proof of financial responsibility in the form of insur-
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even to accomplish its objective of preventing collusive suits. 43 One
author has noted that the justifications themselves are contradictory in
that the first protects the driver (against ungrateful guests) while the
second protects against him (his collusive suits). 4 4 Guest statutes are

hopelessly out of date and ineffective, and it is inevitable that courts
will restrict their application in some instances. The principal case is
but one manifestation of this tendency.
That the Hansel court was willing to go to great lengths to avoid
the application of the guest statute evidences the need for serious
re-evaluation by the legislature. Leaving such a task to the courts can
only lead to further confusion in an area of the law which requires
certainty. It is possible that a repeal of the guest statute may result in
a slightly higher incidence of collusive suits. However, the mere fact
that some fraudulent claims may be made is little justification for denying recovery to an entire class of innocent victims.

ance. the doctrine is more appropriately directed at fairness to the insurer. With respect
to this justification, one commentator has appropriately suggested that:
The only justification for altering general law should be to further the public good.
not to compensate special interests for collateral wrongs.
Id. at 277. Higher insurance premiums might accomplish the same result. However,
"there appears to be no correlation between the existence or nonexistence of a guest
statute" and the level of insurance premiums or underwriting profits. Lascher. litpra
note 37. at 13.
43. One author suggests that the guest statutes have caused more suits and greater
problems by spawning a multiplicity of cases construing the terms of the statute and
"exaggerated and fraudulent claims being made by the guest passenger in order to come
within" the statutory exceptions. Weinstein. Shoutld We Kill the Guest Pa.,en'r Act?,
33 Di[i RO I LAWYER 185. 187 (1965). It is also suggested that. with today's sophisticated judges and juries "who can easily distinguish between a colluded case between
the driver and the passenger, the danger of collusion or fraud against the insurance
company is a relic of the past, in this area of the law." Id. at 189.
Another author proposes a questionable ground for attacking the guest statute, that it
is as easy to lie about gross negligence as it is to lie about negligence. See Gibson. sttpra
note 42. This may be true, but it seems unlikely if conduct which falls within the guest
statute definition of gross negligence is also criminal.
44. Lascher. supra note 37. at 15.
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